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In loving memory of my late grandmother Czesława Strąg, The Righteous Among the
Nations of the World who tirelessly taught me that in order to really move forward we must
never forget about our historical baggage, good and bad
“If this is your land, where are your stories?”
T. Chamberlin, If this is Your Land, where are Your Stories? Reimagining Home and
Sacred Space (Pilgrim Press, 2003)
Prelude. From captured states to captive minds
The past has not been spared from the “politics of resentment” engulfing Poland for the last
two years. The peculiar (mis)understanding and political instrumentalization of history by
Polish rulers provide an important cautionary tale against one-sided partisan historical
debate as it impacts how we remember the past and see ourselves today.
The most recent installment of this „politics of memory” came with the proposed change to
the Act on the Institute of National Remembrance to criminalize publicly and erroneously
assigning to the Polish nation any blame for the Nazi crimes committed by the III Reich.
The Minister of Justice, Mr Ziobro, the most dangerous man in a government full of
dangerous men, presented his rationale as follows: „[…] the Polish government took an
important step in the direction of creating stronger legal instruments allowing us to defend
our rights, defend the historical truth, and defend Poland’s good name everywhere in the
world”. He alluded to the notorious “Polish death camps” designation occasionally
appearing in the foreign media, and potentially suggesting co-responsibility on the part of
the Poles for the crimes committed by Nazi Germany. He vowed to prosecute all those who
defame Poland or the Polish Nation. The draft has already sparked a furore over its scope
and the severity of its sanctions, and has been criticized as a “blunt instrument”, yet another
example of nationalist revival in Poland and the return of revisionist history. Critics have
also pointed out the possible dangers of limiting free speech and research and of building
the martyrological narrative wherein the world does not understand how much Poland
suffered.
Catchy headlines aside, there are important general lessons to be learnt from this foray into
the past.
„Memory capture”
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„Memory capture” is a generic and novel concept. It rejects an inclusive approach to the
past which would allow all voices to be heard. Instead it offers a one-dimensional
explanation of where “We, the people” come from and what makes up our national identity,
resulting in a „mis-memory”. While the mis-memory manifests itself in many places and
under many guises, it has one unifying premise: denouncing the “Round Table Talks” in
1989 and the peaceful transition of power that has ensued as a rotten compromise struck
by Lech Wałęsa (now seen a traitor and secret collaborator with the communists) and his
Solidarność (Solidarity) with the outgoing communist regime as a means of keeping the old
elites alive.
According to this narrative, Polish politics and institutions (e.g. constitutional review) are all
a sham, and the Third Republic (brought into existence in 1989) has never been a real
state, but rather a phantom state based on the intellectual corruption of the political elites,
bribery, dysfunctional government, caving in to Brussels, selling off Poland to strangers for
peanuts, and waiting at the beck and call of Germany.
„Memory capture” is vindictive: the Poles are entitled to greater respect and recognition for
their significant suffering in the past, and Poland must be compensated for all the injustices
done to it by the „dark” foreign powers. „Memory capture” arranges these bits and pieces in
a particular order, thus enslaving the past within one dominant narrative. The historical
debate and our collective memory becomes tainted by an imbalance, as certain elements
are celebrated, while others that do not fit the overarching narrative are relegated to the
margins of public discourse, castigated, and now penalized. Anyone who counters the
dominant understanding of our past is characterized as a liar and a traitor. Passing the new
law will, according to this narrative, help this crusade progress even faster and in a more
disciplined way.
Historical debate: owning up to our fallibility?
Any controversial aspects of a nation’s history must be discussed openly and
dispassionately (for the relevant ECtHR case law, see detailed analysis here). Reopening
the historical debate to probe less-known or potentially controversial aspects of our history
should form an important part of our common efforts to unearth the past, present and
future. Seeking the historical truth does not equate finding it. Sometimes the process itself
is gratifying, even if a final result is unattainable. This is the price for maintaining an
“overlapping consensus” and living in a divided society with competing visions of our
history. Every voice is important as long as it adds to the ongoing debate. Nobody should
be excluded, much less penalized, for taking part in the exchange of views about history,
which may go against the mainstream (and often momentary) narrative, often rather more
political than about seeking historical truth.
In trying to understand the current Polish way of historical remembering – or rather our
national “mis-memory” – the analysis of Tony Judt can be very instructive. He argues that
two kinds of memories emerged from what he calls the “official version of the wartime
experience” which became dominant in Europe by 1948. One was that of the things done to
“us” by Germans during the war, and the other that of things (however similar) done by “us”
to “others” after the war. This created „(t)wo moral vocabularies, two sorts of reasoning, two
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different pasts. In this circumstance, the uncomfortably confusing recollection of things
dome by us to others during the war […] got conveniently lost”. Crucially, it has built post-
war national mythology around “examples and stories which were repeated and magnified,
ad nausea [sic!], in novels, popular histories, radio, newspapers, and especially cinema”.
Importantly, this mythology took on special importance in Eastern Europe. Judt rightly
points out the communists’ interest in „flattering the recalcitrant local population by inviting it
to believe the fabrication now deployed on its behalf by the USSR – to wit, that central and
eastern Europe was an innocent victim of German assault, had played no part in its own
downfall or in the crimes perpetrated on its territory, and was a full partner in the work of
liberation led by Soviet soldiers abroad and communist partisans at home”.
„Memory capture” on the rise in Poland painfully shows that the past is indeed, and
continues to be, a “foreign country”. With the new legislation, the signal is being sent that
far from being internalized, history lessons are instrumentalized to serve the new political
masters’ vision of the past. The same admonition applies to confronting one’s past and
building a memory that would capture the entirety of the historical baggage. Only then will
Poles be able to remember honestly and move forward. By revealing the past, we discover
the present, and most importantly, build the future in keeping with the constitutional fidelity
that binds us across generations. This is so because „we turn to the past not because the
past contains within it all of the answers to our questions, but because it is the repository of
our common struggles and common commitments; it offers us invaluable resources as we
debate the most important questions of political life, which cannot fully and finally be
settled”.
All this must not be read as belittling the sufferings of the Polish people and the heroism of
Polish Righteous among the nations of the World, or questioning Poland’s resistance in the
face of the atrocities of Nazi occupation. Nobody denies that. My point is different.
The unimaginable destruction of life – physical, spiritual, and cultural – wrought on us would
have been more than enough to wipe out entire nations less strong than the Poles. We
survived because history was always a repository on which to build a new order and rebuild
life. We relied on our accumulated constitutional fidelity and moved forward. We
remembered both the good and the bad, and what saved us and our way of life.
Therefore, my argument against an imposed understanding of history favours an inclusive
historical memory that brings together and exposes all national experiences and narratives.
Building a historical debate calls for never-ending “pacting” between the past, present, and
future. Such “pacting” would move us away from “a historiography obsessed with minutiae
and overgrown with easy assumptions about martyrology”. Jeremy Waldron is correct that
“[o]nly the deliberate enterprise of recollection (the enterprise we call “history”), coupled
with the most determined sense that there is a difference between what happened and
what we would like to think happened, can sustain the moral and cultural reality of self and
community”.
A nation that is not ready to embark on a comprehensive journey into its past is
impoverished and unable to move forward with true understanding of who “We” really are.
When grand gestures dominate, and less spectacular soul-searching is lacking, nations
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become captives of the past rather than its masters.
It is here that Polish debate over “What really happened?” must be ongoing, and is far from
over. It must be subject to the most critical and demanding inquiry and exchanges.
Imposing sanctions for statements that go against the grain of the mainstream
understanding would clearly inhibit the free flow of views and lead to a “one and only” vision
of the past. The debate will become flattened and ultimately stifled, as prospective
participants who hold different views will be discouraged – and even excluded – from
joining the discussion. The media will think twice before stirring up a new controversy that
would be justified by public interest. Consequently, public discussion will become
predictable and one-sided, always sitting well within the expectations of the regime and its
historical policy.
A narrative of contested pasts
The last thing Poland needs today is spreading an all-too-easy “culture of treason”,
(ab)using its own vision of the past and history as a tool to fight political adversaries and
divide Poles into “better“ and “worse” sorts, imposing one historical orthodoxy on society
and enforcing it through criminal law, all as part of the wicked politics of resentment and
mis-memory. As Jan Błoński put it in his now classic analysis, „on this Polish graveyard our
obligation to carry the past must boil down to seeing this past in truth”.
Historical debate should strive for pragmatic recognition that our constitutional allegiances
are shaped, reshaped, and re-examined as we move forward. There is no place for fear of
failure, because failure is part of the fidelity we owe to ourselves. The past must be the key
to the future, but not only. Memory properly understood should challenge dominant
accounts of history. It might be used to disguise and cover up, or to liberate and reveal.
What matters, though, is that no single overarching master narrative exists, and that
disagreement is part and parcel of many “contested pasts”. True historical debate must
resemble democracy, where all voices are heard. As the majority must not oppress the
minority, dominant historic narratives cannot exclude less popular views of historical
events. Unfortunately, in Poland the past continues to be seen as a collection of
indisputable truths, not open to divergent interpretations and historical debate.
Truly disconcerting is the new role played by the law in the process of framing the historical
debate, namely to enforce “the official truths” while suppressing any disagreement. To
prevent this from happening, each of us in our own way must try, paraphrasing Milosz’s
„Captive Mind”, to move beyond being a mere passive spectator of the historical narrative
and become a critical actor in how this narrative is written, shaped and understood, what
stories are (re)told and how. The paranoid politics has already destroyed the judicial
review, courts, and free media. It now sets its sights on historical memory. We must never
let it turn us into captive minds. This is where the politics of mis-memory pose the
existential danger that the Polish Past and History will become an uncontested sphere,
dominated by a truth superimposed from above, a truly foreign country with the power of
story-telling available only to the “lucky few”.
Poland of 2018 finds itself at a critical juncture – suspended between old myths and the
narratives of “what happened” on the one hand, and the rejection of any attempts to finally
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discover the multi-dimensional pasts that Poles must own up to, on the other. The capture
of the state and institutions in Poland is relentless and all-embracing. While the captured
institutions might be rebuilt, it will take generations to free captive minds and souls. As „We
Poles” are imperfect, beautiful, impulsive, contradictory, all this and more, the historical
narrative must be allowed to reflect and bring to light the diversity of not only our great
moments, but also imperfections, frailties and dark sides. After all, this is MY, YOUR and
OUR history. These are MY, YOUR and OUR myths and stories. Not theirs.
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